Is another summer war coming for Georgia?

A sequel to last August's conflict in Georgia - the one that saw Russian troops push almost to Georgia's capital Tbilisi and Georgia lose what little control they had over their two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia - is looking more and more likely.

Let's start with NATO's ill-conceived decision to go ahead with exercises this week in Georgia. Rightly or wrongly, Russia is terribly paranoid about NATO's eastward expansion, especially where Georgia and Ukraine are considered. NATO's response has been that these exercises were scheduled more than a year ago, before the August conflict between Georgia and Russia, and that Russia was even invited to participate. That may all be true, but given the war and the tense feelings, postponing the exercise until things were calmer would have been the wise move. But NATO didn't want it to seem like Russia was bossing them around, so for pride’s sake, NATO went ahead with the Georgia exercise, despite the possibility they could destabilize the fragile peace in the region (an ironic move for an organization dedicated to promoting peace and security).

But Russia isn't blameless either. Just after the NATO exercises began, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed two pacts giving Russia jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia's borders with Georgia - a move the European Union, in turn, says will destabilize the region. This will put Russian troops eye-to-eye with the same Georgian forces they faced last August. And its not the first military agreement Russia has signed with the two regions they (and Nicaragua) recognize as independent nations - Russia has been setting up military bases in both places and recently agreed to establish a new naval base in Abkhazia, which could one day host part of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.

Then there's Georgia itself, which, to put it bluntly, is a mess. Opposition protests against Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili are moving into their second month, with rallies drawing tens of thousands demanding he step down - they blame Saakashvili for failing to go through with democratic reforms, for ruining the economy and for the disastrous August war. Last week an entire tank battalion in the Georgian army, stationed just outside Tbilisi, briefly mutinied, before surrendering peacefully.

Saakashvili blamed the mutiny on Russian agents; the opposition said that Saakashvili staged the whole thing to discredit them, while the commander of the battalion said that his troops revolted to protest the ongoing fight within the government. None of the explanations are good for Georgia though - if Saakashvili's right then Russia has infiltrated Georgia to such a degree then its only a matter of time until he's gone; if the opposition's right then there is no telling what Saakashvili might do to stay in power; and if we take the commander at his word then it shows a deep level of frustration among members of the military with the civilian government and a growing willingness to take action.

So Georgia seems to be teetering on the edge while being pushed by forces both external and domestic. But what makes a second conflict this summer such a possibility is how almost every side can see how more fighting would be in their best interests.

Saakashvili has staked much of his reputation on getting back the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (a desire which led to last summer's war) - he could see a new conflict as a way of boosting his own reputation, while also hoping that new fighting would spark 'rally 'round the flag' feelings among his fellow Georgians. At the same time, the opposition could view a new war as the final nail in Saakashvili's coffin and hope that it would be the thing most Georgians would need to see him as an incompetent, unstable leader and finally turn on him.

Russia could also see a renewed conflict as a way of finally getting rid of the wildly pro-Western Saakashvili and hopefully replacing him with a more pro-Moscow leader. Russia would like a Georgian leader more willing to follow Moscow's lead on energy policy (Georgia currently hosts the only oil pipeline from Central Asia that does not pass through Russian territory) and desperately wants to reopen land routes to Armenia, a strongly pro-Moscow ally in the region, but one that is also cut off from Russia (a big problem for the Russian military forces based there).

Finally Abkhazia and South Ossetia could see a new conflict as a way of deepening their economic ties to Moscow and gaining more recognition as independent nations from the international community.

All in all it is likely to mean another summer of conflict in the Southern Caucasus. The simple fact of history is that when people want to go to war, they usually find a way.